To reflect the firm’s growth, Lilenfeld PC has updated our firm brochure. See the updated version here.
David Lilenfeld
To reflect the firm’s growth, Lilenfeld PC has updated our firm brochure. See the updated version here.
David Lilenfeld
More and more, legal departments are moving their work from large, big-name law firms to small, boutique firms like Lilenfeld PC. While the recession prompted much of this movement, I am now observing that this is a lasting practice for efficiency-minded in-house counsel.
Boutique law firms such as ours are flourishing because clients are turning to different law firms for different tasks. This practice allows legal departments to match specific tasks to the right lawyers. For example, a new client came to us recently specifically because most of the litigation we handle involves trademark infringement claims.
Legal departments are recognizing the benefits of splitting work between firms with different focuses and using small, boutique firms that offer the right fit for each individual matter. In-house attorneys also acknowledge that the work produced by small firms is as good as (or better than) what they receive from large, big-name law firms. Small firms like ours also have far fewer conflicts, can make decisions regarding representation in hours instead of days and are equipped to provide personalized service.
Technology has also made small firms more competitive with large ones. Software, for example, speeds up document production and review, while, cloud computing makes sharing documents, invoices and case developments fast and efficient.
Lilenfeld PC focuses entirely on intellectual property, and its highest hourly billing rate is $325, a rate 40 to 50 percent lower than that of large-firm counterparts. Our clients receive the same level of expertise as clients of large firms but at a lower price. Since we have less overhead, we have lower rates, which helps our clients manage budgets and increases the volume of business we receive.
Consider talking with us about your intellectual property needs.
David M. Lilenfeld
Fed Cir.’s reverses N.D.Ga. grant of summary judgment to defendant in patent infringement case, ruling the trial court had authority to correct an obvious drafting error in a claim. Here is the opinion.
David Lilenfeld
Judge Timothy C. Batten’s (N.D.Ga.) 23-page “Instructions to Parties and Counsel” is an excellent manual on finer points of federal civil procedure. Good read for all fed court litigators.
David Lilenfeld
Here is a recent article from the Atlanta Business Chronicle.
David Lilenfeld
Ferrari names its new race car “F150,” sued by Ford. Dilution claim very strong (Ford says it spent $1.9B on F150 ads since ’99). Here is Complaint.
David Lilenfeld
The Ninth Circuit no longer requires that marks be identical or nearly identical for federal dilution claim. Here is the opinion.
Levi Strauss & Co. filed a federal trademark dilution claim against Abercrombie & Fitch for infringing Levi’s back pocket stitch design for Levi jeans. The case made it to a jury trial during which the trial court (Northern District of California) asked the jury to make advisory rulings on fact issues, including whether the two designs were “identical or nearly identical.” The jury answered that they were neither, from which the District Court entered judgment in A&F’s favor on the dilution claim. Levi appealed.
The Ninth Circuit observed that the “identical or nearly identical” standard has origins in state law and was incongruous with the federal Trademark Dilution Revision Act’s (15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)) scheme. The TDRA allows for relief when there is similarity between defendant’s mark and plaintiff’s famous mark which impairs the distinctiveness of the famous mark. Given that, the Court ruled that all three previously used dilution standards – identicalness, near identicalness and substantial similarity – were too strenuous under TDRA.
Now, at least in the Ninth Circuit, a TDRA plaintiff must only show that the marks are similar and that the junior mark is likely to impair the distinctiveness of the famous mark.
David Lilenfeld
This blog entry was inspired by Sarah Palin and her daughter, Bristol. No, I am not about to get political, so keep reading. Instead, the famous Alaskans have given me an opportunity to write about trademark law’s treatment of personal names.
Sarah and Bristol Palin have applied to the United States Patent and Trademark Office to register their names as trademarks. Ms. Palin claims she uses SARAH PALIN in connection with providing “[i]nformation about political elections” and “motivational speaking services in the field of politics, culture, business and values.” Bristol says she uses BRISTOL PALIN in connection with “motivational speaking services in the field of life choices.” Here are their applications: Sarah/Bristol.
Will the Palins have a hard time obtaining these registrations — “you betcha”!
A person cannot register her name as a trademark without a showing of “secondary meaning.” Secondary meaning is a high standard to meet. In connection with personal names, it is achieved when the public has come to recognize the personal name as a symbol that identifies the service (or good), in contrast to identifying the person.
The mark SARAH PALIN is used to identify a person, not a service. In other words, the public does not connect the name SARAH PALIN with a particular service, but rather with a particular person, at least not yet. The same reasoning applies to Bristol, perhaps even more so since she does not have same level of notoriety as her mother.
Secondary meaning tends to grow out of a long association of the name with a particular business. Secondary meaning requires that, in the public mind, the primary meaning of the name as a word identifying a person has been lost in favor of identifying the business. Examples of personal names which have acquired secondary meaning – and therefore are protected as trademarks — are RONALD MCDONALD, HOWARD JOHNSON and, to a lesser extent, MARTHA STEWART. Indeed, it takes time before the name and the business become synonymous in the public mind.
So, if you hear a loud “doggone it” coming from Wasilla, that means the Palins just received a final refusal to register their names as trademarks. It’s on the way.
David Lilenfeld
We are pleased to announce that Tom Shepherd has joined Lilenfeld PC. Tom brings a wealth of business litigation experience to the Firm, having been both outside litigation counsel and an in-house attorney. He joins the Firm as “Of Counsel” and adds firepower to our growing litigation practice.
David M. Lilenfeld
This is for non-lawyers and lawyers who do not practice in the area of intellectual property. It is meant to correct a very common and damaging misconception about United States copyright law. As an intellectual property litigator, I see this error frequently and, for those copyright owners who end-up having to deal with an infringer, it creates a serious problem.
Most of us understand that works gain the protection of U.S. copyright law when they are created and fixed in some tangible format. This is accurate and important but, at the same time, a little bit misleading. Creating and fixing your work affords you with rights, but . . . and here is the key . . . you cannot enforce those rights without a copyright registration (A refusal from the Copyright Office to register will also suffice, although you will have to prove to the court that the Copyright Office’s refusal was improper).
In other words, you cannot bring a lawsuit under the U.S. Copyright Act until your work is registered or registration was refused. If your work is infringed, you can rush to register it, but having waiting, you will likely have forfeited your right to recover money damages or attorney fees.
So, register your work and do so early. Think of the registration as your key to the courtroom.
And, while on the topic, let’s quickly address another misconception. There is no “poor man’s copyright.” The practice of sending a copy of your own work to yourself and then relying on the date on the envelope gives no copyright protection. Save your stamp!
David M. Lilenfeld
Clearing up some confusion, the Eighth Circuit holds definitively that under the Lanham Act actual confusion is not a prerequisite to an award of money damages. Here is a copy of the 0pinion.
David Lilenfeld
How strong is the suffix ‘VILLE as a trademark for online games? We may find out soon. West Virginia game developer Blingville files Declaratory Judgment action against Zynga (maker of Farmville) after Zynga demanded that Blingville stop using ‘VILLE as suffix for online games. Copy of complaint is attached here.
David M. Lilenfeld
The Atlanta-Journal Constitution asked me to write about Google’s keyword advertising practices for its paper.
The online advertising trademark tug-of-war continues. One of Google’s most determined opponents has been Rosetta Stone, maker of second language software. After losing to the search engine giant at the district court level, Rosetta Stone brought the fight to the Fourth Circuit where its appeal pends.
One barometer of the importance of legal issues raised on appeal is the number of amicus briefs filed. My guess is that 90% of federal appeals have no amicus briefs. This case has a backbreaking 36, almost all by trademark owners supporting Rosetta Stone’s position that Google’s ad programs either directly or indirectly infringe their trademarks.
With billions of advertising revenue at stake, Google is leaving no stone unturned. A loss here could cost GOOG billions.
Estoy deseando leer esta opinión! (That is, “I am looking forward to reading this opinion” in Spanish).
David M. Lilenfeld